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Car-ramming attacks, or vehicular assaults, in which drivers deliberately plow their vehicles into public 
gatherings, pedestrians, or bicyclists, have become an increasingly common terrorist tactic. The 
numbers are still small, but they are clearly on the rise. A review of this tactic and recent uses of it 
leads to a number of observations:
•	 The number of car-ramming attacks and their lethality are increasing.
•	 These	attacks	reflect	the	current	practice	of	terrorists	remotely	inspiring	operatives	rather	than	
recruiting	 them.	 They	 also	 reflect	 the	 trend	 toward	 totally	 random	violence—what	might	 be	
called “pure terrorism.”
•	 The	 “weapon”—a	motor	 vehicle—is	 easily	 obtainable,	 and	 a	 ramming	 attack	 requires	 little	
preparation and little skill.
•	 Car-ramming	is	effective,	allowing	attackers	to	achieve	high	body	counts	and	cause	widespread	
alarm. It is the one tactic whose lethality in the developed world comes close to that of attacks 
in the developing world, which normally have much higher levels of lethality.
•	 Attackers	 proclaiming	 allegiance	 to	 jihadist	 groups	 are	 more	 lethal	 than	 others—again,	 a	
reflection	of	ideology	and	strategy.
•	 As was the case with airline hijackings in the 1960s, many of the attackers turn out to be 
mentally disordered persons who may be inspired to copy terrorist attacks.
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•	 The deadliest car-ramming incidents occur where vehicles mow down pedestrians at public 
gatherings such as open-air markets or on pedestrianized streets from which cars are 
prohibited but nevertheless can enter. Open-air markets and celebrations attract crowds, 
and	foot	traffic	on	pedestrianized	streets	is	usually	dense.	This	makes	these	venues	lucrative	
targets for vehicular assaults.
LITTLE CHANGE IN TERRORIST TACTICS
Terrorist	tactics	have	evolved	incrementally	over	the	past	half-century.	The	basic	terrorist	repertoire—
bombings,	armed	assaults,	assassinations,	hostage-taking—remains	close	to	what	it	was	in	the	early	
1970s. Over time, heightened security measures have reduced certain tactics and attacks on certain 
target sets: Airline hijackings have become a rare event; terrorists no longer storm embassies; and 
fewer diplomats are kidnapped.
Terrorists have always preferred soft targets where they do not have to overcome security measures. 
Since unprotected targets are virtually unlimited, there is little pressure for terrorist innovation in tactics 
or weapons.
The	terrorist	arsenal	has	also	remained	stable	for	a	half-century.	Improvised	explosives,	assault	rifles,	
and	ordinary	firearms	are	used	in	most	attacks	and	account	for	most	casualties.	Recent	knife	and	axe	
attacks	and	vehicular	assaults	reflect	a	trend	toward	more-primitive	weapons	and	tactics.	This,	in	turn,	
reflects	recent	changes	in	terrorist	strategies	and	recruiting.
BIG CHANGES IN TERRORIST STRATEGIES AND RECRUITING
Terrorists escalated their violence by orders of magnitude between the 1970s and 2001, the year of 
the	9/11	attacks—from	tens	to	hundreds	to	thousands.	Terrorist	tactics	rely	on	shock	value	to	attract	
attention.	Staying	in	the	headlines	requires	escalating	violence.	
The emergence of groups inspired by religion-based ideologies contributed to the escalation of 
violence. The substitution of God’s will for political constituency eroded self-imposed constraints. 
Religious	fanatics	count	only	on	heavenly	approval	for	their	actions.	Condemnation	by	those	regarded	
as	 unbelievers	 or	 infidels	 matters	 little,	 and	 undiluted	 commitment	 guarantees	 paradise.	 Among	
religiously inspired terrorists, suicide attacks became common.
Extrapolating from the 9/11 attacks led authorities to worry about future events that could produce tens 
or hundreds of thousands of casualties. Attacks of this scale could be achieved only with weapons 
of mass destruction, which many presumed would be the next terrorist step. But obtaining such 
weapons	would	require	centralized	enterprises	with	considerable	resources	and	capabilities.
Terrorism has not followed the anticipated post-9/11 trajectory. Following the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda 
was put under enormous pressure, and many of its leaders and key operatives were killed or captured, 
while its communications and control were disrupted, degrading its operational capabilities. On the 
run or hiding out, al Qaeda’s central leadership was obliged to rely on the local initiative of its members 
to continue its global jihad. In this more-hostile operating environment, carrying out strategic strikes 
on the scale of 9/11 or even larger seemed less likely. 
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Until about 2006, al Qaeda alumni and allies were still able to carry out terrorist operations that were one 
or	two	orders	of	magnitude	less	than	the	9/11	attacks	but	still	spectacular—attacks	in	Tunisia,	Indonesia,	
Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan, in addition to major attacks in Spain and the 
United	Kingdom.	These	attacks	persuaded	the	countries	affected	to	more	vigorously	suppress	the	local	
groups that threatened them directly and to cooperate more closely with other nations facing similar 
threats. Gradually the level of violence subsided, although lower-level attacks continued.
However, the political tumult that spread across North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 presented 
the	jihadists	with	new	opportunities,	which	al	Qaeda	was	quick	to	exploit.	Its	comeback,	however,	was	
disrupted by a deadly internal schism that saw the emergence of a rival jihadist enterprise in Syria and 
Iraq—the	Islamic	State	of	Iraq	and	(greater)	Syria,	or	ISIS.	
ISIS took advantage of the civil war in Syria and continuing antipathy between the Sunnis and Shias 
in	Iraq	to	sweep	across	the	two	countries	and	establish	the	Islamic	State,	which	attracted	expressions	
of support and pledges of loyalty from groups across the region. In contrast to al Qaeda’s priority of 
attacking	the	“far	enemy,”	ISIS	remained	focused	on	the	local	struggle—building	the	Islamic	State	and	
defending	its	territory.	But	like	al	Qaeda,	ISIS	used	the	Internet	and,	even	more	effectively,	social	media	
to attract recruits and inspire action abroad. Instead of the vertical escalation anticipated immediately 
after	9/11,	the	jihadists	escalated	laterally	to	remotely	field	a	global	army.
Recruiting	 into	 the	 ranks	 of	 the	 post-9/11	 jihadists	 differed	 significantly	 from	 terrorist	 recruiting	 in	
the 1970s. The early cohorts of volunteers were vetted before being taken into tiny clandestine 
organizations,	which	had	to	survive	underground	in	a	hostile	environment.	The	danger	of	infiltrators	or	
of unreliable recruits posed operational and organizational risks. The groups remained small. 
In contract, jihadist recruiting relied on exhortation rather than traditional recruiting. Volunteers were 
urged via the Internet and social media to act on their own initiative. If they could make it to an 
al Qaeda training camp or, later, to the Islamic State, they would be welcome. Tens of thousands 
flocked	to	the	Islamic	State.	It	is	unlikely	that	all	of	the	arrivals	were	reliable,	but	this	was	not	a	serious	
problem	where	 ISIS	maintained	absolute	control—recruits	could	not	easily	betray	 the	organization,	
and if judged unreliable, they could be dispatched to suicide missions.
Recruiting	for	operations	abroad	required	no	investment	on	the	part	of	ISIS.	Their	online	magazines	
and communicators on social media could reach a broad audience, providing potential recruits with 
inspiration and instructions. If they carried out an attack, their actions would bring applause and 
recognition—the	remote	conferral	of	membership	as	warriors.	It	was	low-yield	ore,	producing	a	large	
but mostly virtual army and occasional low-level actions.
The	change	in	recruiting	methods	produced	changes	in	the	local	terrorist	population	and	also	affected	
tactics.	The	 Internet	attracted	 individuals—it	did	not	create	 local	groups.	Terrorist	campaigns	were	
replaced	by	one-off	attacks;	there	was	no	institutional	learning,	no	improvement	in	operational	skills	
over time. Instead, jihadists remained mostly unconnected individuals operating alone with limited 
resources. When they did reach out to join others, they risked being taken in by police undercover 
operations.	 Isolated	 jihadists	could	not	sustain	 terrorist	campaigns	or	 inspire	sufficient	numbers	 to	
create a high volume of violence. 
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THE CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM WAS UNIQUE
The	 terrorist	attacks	carried	out	by	 ISIS-affiliated	operatives	 in	France	and	Belgium	between	2014	
and 2016 have been cited as an example of an ISIS-directed campaign, but they are the exception 
that proves the rule. The campaign was the product of a group of Belgian and French radicals led 
by	Abdelhamid	Abaaoud,	a	Belgian	jihadist	who	traveled	to	Syria	to	join	ISIS	in	2014.	While	in	Syria,	
Abaaoud recruited other Belgian and French volunteers who had come to join ISIS and sent them back 
to Europe to carry out attacks. 
Abaaoud’s network had a number of operational advantages. Many of the recruits came from a 
subculture that transcended the criminal underworld and the radicalized underground. A number of 
them had criminal backgrounds, had carried out violent crimes, and were accustomed to living on the 
run. They had connections with local confederates who provided them with logistics support. They 
knew and could trust one another. 
Despite these capabilities, until November 2015, Abaaoud’s network of operatives achieved no major 
successes. Some were arrested, and some were killed in shootouts with police. One accidentally shot 
himself and was arrested when he called for help. Another failed to operate his weapon correctly and 
was	quickly	subdued.	
Abaaoud	had	to	personally	return	to	Europe	to	assemble	the	force	of	seasoned	fighters	returning	from	
Syria and local volunteers that carried out the bloody attacks in Paris. Abaaoud himself was cornered 
and killed soon after those attacks. With police closing in, other members of the Abaaoud network 
carried out the suicide attacks in Brussels in March 2016, but by the end of 2016, the network was 
largely dismantled. 
CAR-RAMMING ATTACKS REFLECT CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES
Both al Qaeda and ISIS have urged the use of vehicles to mow down pedestrians. It is an ideal tactic 
for	today’s	circumstances.	Vehicles	are	a	readily	available	“weapon.”	Limited	skill	is	required,	and	the	
ability	to	drive	is	widespread.	Little	preparation	is	required	for	an	attack.	Cities	filled	with	people	and	
vehicles provide ample targets, which cannot easily be protected, and high body counts are potentially 
achievable. It is not surprising, then, that the number of car-ramming attacks has increased.
Information on trends and patterns of relevant cases of vehicular assaults may lead to better 
understanding of the tactic and could assist in making judgments about how best to deal with it. We 
have collected and analyzed the available data on such attacks and have outlined some possible 
measures for mitigating them in the future.1
THE DATA ANALYZED IN THIS REPORT—WHAT’S IN AND WHAT’S OUT
Car rammings occur almost every day. Most of these are not vehicular assaults by terrorists, but rather 
rammings by criminals, drunks, drivers overcome by road rage, persons in the middle of arguments. 
The drivers deliberately crash into other cars, try to run over antagonists, and, increasingly, try to ram 
police cars. We exclude these events from our analysis. We also exclude vehicular attacks in which the 
primary purpose is to deliver an explosive device. 
1 The database used in this analysis has been created by the authors and is not part of the terrorist databases held by 
either	the	Mineta	Transportation	Institute	or	the	RAND	Corporation.	
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Using	 the	 Global	 Terrorism	 Database	 maintained	 by	 START	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Maryland,	 some	
material	provided	by	the	RAND	Corporation,	and	a	few	incidents	contained	in	MTI’s	own	database,	
along	with	our	own	searches,	we	identified	about	120	terrorist	car-ramming	events.	Our	focus	was	on	
attacks directed against public targets, that is, those directed against pedestrians on public streets or 
adjacent public buildings, including tourist sites, hospitals, and restaurants; public gatherings, including 
street markets, spectator events, celebrations, and demonstrations; and surface transportation hubs, 
including bus stops and train or bus stations. We also included attacks against police or other security 
personnel guarding public places. We were especially interested in attacks by persons who expressed 
some kind of political motive, but we also included attacks by persons judged mentally disordered, 
recognizing that the line between the two types of attackers is sometimes a thin one.
We excluded attacks in war zones, where police or military personnel manning checkpoints are often 
targets. We also excluded ramming attacks on government buildings such as embassies or military 
bases, as well as attacks on private corporate buildings, all of which normally have their own security 
and	to	which	access	is	not	unrestricted.	Also	excluded	were	accidents—which,	by	definition,	are	not	
attacks—as	well	as	ramming	attacks	that	targeted	a	particular	individual,	such	as	altercations	between	
motorists, and rammings connected with common criminals and car chases. 
That left 78 attacks for analysis. We cannot claim that this represents the universe of car-ramming 
attacks—incidents	with	no	or	few	casualties	that	occurred	years	ago	in	areas	with	little	media	coverage	
may be lost in the mist of time.
We collected the available information about the 78 attacks and sorted it according to date, country, 
nature of target, perpetrator, circumstances, casualties, and other attributes. In doing so, we relied 
primarily	on	media	accounts	from	generally	reliable	sources.	We	did	not	use	any	classified	information	
or detailed police or court reports. In some cases, we did not have accurate data on the vehicle type 
or weight or information about its speed, which would be useful. While there is still work to be done 
and	errors	are	always	possible,	we	are	confident	that	we	have	a	reasonably	accurate	record	of	the	
selected events.
OVERALL TRENDS—MORE FREQUENT AND MORE LETHAL
The 78 attacks occurred between January 1973 and the end of April 2018. They resulted in 281 deaths 
and	approximately	1,200	injuries.	The	increasing	frequency	of	vehicular	attacks	is	shown	in	Figure	1,	
and the increasing lethality of those same attacks is shown in Figure 2. 
Because	there	are	relatively	few	events	over	a	long	period	of	time	(more	than	45	years),	the	trend	lines	
can be misleading. However, the recent increase is obvious. There were 16 attacks between 1973 and 
2007 and 62 attacks between 2008 and the end of April 2018. Thirty of these occurred in 2017 and the 
first	four	months	of	2018	alone.
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Figure 1: Vehicle Rammings Over Time, 1973-2017
	
Figure 2: Vehicle Ramming Lethality Over Time, 1973-2017
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The	average	fatality	per	attack	(FPA)	in	the	events	we	examined	was	3.6.	This	is	significantly	higher	
than the 2.3 FPA for all attacks on surface transportation targets during the same period. It is also 0.6 
higher than the 3.0 FPA for attacks on public surface transportation passengers. 
This	is	significant,	as	public	surface	transportation	targets	have	been	attacked	by	terrorists	seeking	
high body counts. While car-ramming attacks are not on the same scale as bombings, armed assaults, 
or	derailment	attempts,	they	appear	to	be	an	easy	way	for	terrorists,	especially	those	lacking	firearms	
and	explosives,	to	kill	in	quantity.	We	will	return	to	this	point	later.
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF CAR-RAMMING ATTACKS
As shown in Table 1, car-ramming attacks have been employed extensively by Palestinians against 
Israeli	targets.	Of	the	78	attacks	we	examined,	28	(35.9	percent)	occurred	in	Israel	or	the	Occupied	
Territories.	This	reflects	a	continuing	Palestinian	resistance,	constrained	by	its	participants’	inability	to	
obtain	firearms	or	explosives.	Knife	and	car-ramming	attacks	were	the	only	readily	available	means	of	
continuing a terrorist campaign.
Table 1: Geographic Distribution of Attacks by 5-year Periods
 All
Israel & Occupied 
Territories
Developed 
Countriesa
Developing 
Countriesb
5-year Period #Ac #Fd FPAe #A #F FPA #A #F FPA #A #F FPA
1973-1978 1 8 8 - - - 1 8 8 - - -
1979-1982 - - - - - - - - - -  - -
1983-1987 1 0 0 - - - -  - - 1 0 0
1988-1992 1 2 2 1 2 2 -  - - -  - -
1993-1997 4 21 5.3 1 3 3 1 0 0 2 18 9
1998-2002 3 8 2.7 2 8 4 1 0 0 -  - -
2003-2007 6 3 0.5 - - - 6 3 0 -  - -
2008-2012 9 18 2 5 5 1 3 6 2 1 7 7
2013-Apr. 2018 53 221 4.2 19 13 0.7 32 163 5.1 2 45 22.5
Summary 78 281 3.6 28 31 1.1 48 180 5.1 6 70 11.7
a OECD signatories.
b Non-OECD signatories.
c Number of attacks.
d Number of fatalities.
e Fatalities per attack.
However, the number of attacks occurring in developed countries2 has been increasing. Since 2003, 
41	attacks	have	occurred	in	economically	more-advanced	nations.	The	United	States	leads	this	list,	
with a total of 13 attacks, followed by France with 10 attacks, and the United Kingdom with 5.
2 For purposes of this report, developed countries are categorized as those who are currently OECD signatories, and 
developing countries are categorized as those who are not currently OECD signatories; we have created a special 
category	for	Israel	(an	OECD	signatory	country)	and	the	West	Bank	and	Gaza	Strip	(a	non-signatory	country)	because 
of	the	large	number	of	attacks	and	the	unique	nature	of	the	Palestinian	campaign	there.
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LETHALITY OF CAR-RAMMING ATTACKS
As	shown	in	Table	2,	France	has	suffered	the	most	fatalities	from	car-ramming	attacks	in	developed	
countries,	with	a	 total	of	88	 fatalities.	Almost	all	of	 these	 (86)	 resulted	 from	a	2016	attack	 in	Nice.	
China,	where	difficulties	 in	obtaining	explosives	and	firearms	have	 led	 to	more	car-ramming,	knife	
attacks,	and	attacks	with	incendiary	devices,	has	the	next-highest	number	of	fatalities	(52),	followed	
by Israel with 26. Twelve people have died in car-ramming attacks in the United States, 8 of them in a 
2017 attack in New York.
Table 2: Vehicle Attacks and Fatalities, by Country, in Order by Number of Attacks 
Country # Attacks # Fatalities FPAa
France 10 88 8.8
China 3 52 17.3
Israel 14 26 1.9
Haiti 2 18 9.0
Spain 2 15 7.5
Germany 2 14 7.0
United States 13 12 0.9
United Kingdom 5 12 2.4
Canada 2 10 5.0
Czechoslovakia 1 8 8.0
Sweden 2 7 3.5
Netherlands 1 6 6.0
West Bank and Gaza Strip 14 5 0.4
Australia 1 5 5.0
Austria 2 3 1.5
Belgium 1 0 0.0
Ireland 1 0 0.0
Japan 1 0 0.0
Sri Lanka 1 0 0.0
Summary 78 281 3.6
a Fatalities per attack.
Figure 5 presents the same data, but ranked by lethality. The FPA in China was 17.3, the highest of any 
country, but this resulted from only three reported attacks. Haiti was next, with an FPA of 9.0 in two 
attacks, then France, with an FPA of 8.8. In all three cases, a single especially bloody incident drove 
the numbers.
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Table 3: Vehicle Attacks and Fatalities, by Country, in Order by Fatality Per Attack
Country # Attacks # Fatalities FPAa
China 3 52 17.3
Haiti 2 18 9.0
France 10 88 8.8
Czechoslovakia 1 8 8.0
Spain 2 15 7.5
Germany 2 14 7.0
Netherlands 1 6 6.0
Canada 2 10 5.0
Australia 1 5 5.0
Sweden 2 7 3.5
United Kingdom 5 12 2.4
Israel 14 26 1.9
Austria 2 3 1.5
United States 13 12 0.9
West Bank and Gaza Strip 14 5 0.4
Belgium 1 0 0.0
Ireland 1 0 0.0
Japan 1 0 0.0
Sri Lanka 1 0 0.0
Summary 78 281 3.6
a Fatalities per attack.
Car rammings may be the only type of attack in the area of transportation in which lethality in the 
developed world is close to that of such attacks in the developing world. Car-ramming attacks in the 
developed	countries	have	an	average	FPA	of	4.2,	while	those	in	the	developing	world	have	an	FPA	of	
5.0.	(Including	two	attacks	by	Uighur	separatists	in	China	that	together	killed	50,	however,	raises	the	
developing-countries	average	FPA	to	11.7.)	
This may be an anomaly resulting from very small numbers of incidents, which include a few major 
ones,	and	it	may	also	reflect	the	fact	that	while	vehicle-ramming	attacks	may	occasionally	result	 in	
mass-casualty	outliers,	there	is	something	of	a	natural	ceiling—rarely	are	such	attacks	a	tactic	of	mass	
destruction. The average FPA in Israel and the Occupied Territories, which have experienced the most 
car-ramming attacks, is only 0.9. The median FPA, as opposed to the average FPA, for all car-ramming 
attacks is 0.5.
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ARE SUICIDE CAR-RAMMING ATTACKS MORE LETHAL?
Several	factors	make	it	difficult	to	determine	whether	a	vehicular	attacker	is	more	apt	to	be	suicidal	
than	attackers	using	other	modes.	A	person	who	blows	himself	up	is	almost	certainly	suicidal	(unless	
the	person	has	been	persuaded	that	he	controls	a	device	which	is	then	detonated	remotely).	Many	
shooting	attacks	appear	suicidal—the	individual	goes	on	killing	until	he	takes	his	own	life	or	is	shot	by	
police. However, some psychologists believe that such deaths are not truly suicidal. 
As	shown	in	Table	4,	in	which	the	data	are	organized	by	the	number	of	attacks,	six	of	the	car-ramming	
attacks appear to have been suicidal; the nature of the attack made it very unlikely that the assailant 
would escape alive, or the driver took his own life.
In	37	cases,	the	assailant	attempted	to	flee	or	promptly	surrendered.	These	were	not	suicide	attacks.
Between these two poles, there are 15 cases, most often where the attackers continued their attacks 
in	locations	where	police	or	other	security	personnel	were	armed	and	firing;	in	one	case,	the	attacker	
asked police to shoot him. These appear to fall on the suicide side of the spectrum, but whether 
attackers	who	depend	on	others	to	shoot	them	can	be	called	suicidal	is	open	to	question.	They	are	
labeled as “possible.”
In the remaining 20 cases, we lack the detailed information to make a judgment about whether or 
not the attacker was suicidal. In 11 of these, the attacker was killed or injured but may not have been 
suicidal. In 9 cases, the attacker was not killed or injured but presumably was arrested. In none of 
the cases did the attacker get away, so a car-ramming attack apparently calls for a higher level of 
commitment than planting an explosive device or carrying out a gun attack where escape is possible. 
Obviously, the determination of whether these attacks were suicidal is a matter of judgment. 
Table 4: Number of Attacks by Likelihood of Attacker Being Suicidal
Suicide Category # Attacks # Fatalities FPAa
No 37 73 2.0
Possible 15 129 8.6
Unknown - Attacker(s) Injured or Killed 11 7 0.6
Unknown - Attacker(s) not Killed or Injured 9 25 2.8
Yes 6 47 7.8
Summary 78 281 3.6
a Fatalities per attack.
The	question	 is,	does	suicidal	 intent	make	any	difference	 in	 terms	of	 lethality?	The	same	data	on	
suicides,	organized	by	lethality	(Table	5),	suggest	that	it	does.	Definite	and	possible	suicide	cases	have	
a	combined	average	FPA	of	8.4.	Attackers	who	definitely	were	not	suicidal	have	an	average	FPA	of	2.0.	
On the basis of these small numbers, suicide attacks appear to more than double the average lethality 
(3.6	FPA),	increasing	it	by	4.8	FPA.
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Table 5: Number of Attacks by Likelihood of Attacker Being Suicidal
Suicide Category # Attacks # Fatalities FPAa
Possible 15 129 8.6
Yes 6 47 7.8
Unknown - Attacker(s) not Killed or Injured 9 25 2.8
No 37 73 2.0
Unknown - Attacker(s) Injured or Killed 11 7 0.6
Summary 78 281 3.6
a Fatalities per attack.
Vehicular attackers can also do various things to increase casualties. They can swerve the vehicle 
back	and	forth	to	hit	more	targets,	they	can	fire	weapons	or	throw	incendiary	devices	from	the	vehicle	
during the attack, or they can exit the vehicle and continue the attack with other weapons. Table 6 
shows	the	effect	on	lethality	of	using	some	of	these	various	ploys.	
Table 6: Lethality Multipliers by Effect on Average FPA
Lethality Multiplier # Attacks # Fatalities FPAa
FPA > 
Averageb
Suicide+Swerving+Throwing IIDs from the Vehicle 
(e.g., Uighur Attack in China)
1 43 43.0 39.4
Suicide (Yes or Possible) Only 21 176 8.4 4.8
Vehicle Swerve only 25 190 7.6 4.0
Suicide+Swerving+Attack continued with Stabbings 
(e.g., London)
3 12 4.0 0.4
Attack Continued with Stabbings Only 10 21 2.1 -1.5
Attack Continued with Arson Only 4 0 0.0 -3.6
a Fatalities per attack.
b	Difference	between	FPA	and	Average	FPA	(3.6).
In the attacks we examined, swerving alone more than doubled overall FPA. A single attack in China 
in which suicide attackers both swerved and threw incendiary devices from the vehicle increased 
average	 lethality	by	39.4	FPA.	 In	car-ramming	attacks	where	non-suicide	assailants	continued	 the	
attack	 using	 only	 arson	 or	 stabbings,	 the	 effect	 on	 lethality	was	 negative.	 In	 10	 cases,	 the	 driver	
continued	the	attack	by	stabbing;	none	continued	the	attack	with	firearms.	
The size and weight of the vehicle and the ramming speed may end up being far more important in 
increasing	lethality,	but	it	is	too	early	to	determine	the	effects	of	this	factor.
WHO ARE THE ATTACKERS?
Using	 the	 limited	 information	 available	 to	 us,	 we	 created	 11	 different	 attacker	 groups,	 including	
“Jihadist	–	Confirmed	or	Highly	Likely,”	“Jihadist	–	Possible,”	“Mentally	Disordered	–	Confirmed	or	
Highly Likely,” and “Mentally Disordered – Possible.” The numbers and lethality of attacks by these 
groups are shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Number and Lethality of Attacks by Different Attacker Groups
Attacker Groups # Attacks # Fatalities FPAa
Jihadist - Confirmed or Highly Likely 8 133 16.6
Jihadist - Possible 5 5 1.0
Mentally Disordered Individual - Possible 2 1 0.5
Mentally Disordered Individual - Confirmed or Highly Likely 17 33 1.9
Palestinian Group - Non-Jihadist 5 11 2.2
Palestinian without a Specific Islamic Group Affilitation 22 20 0.9
Right-Wing Extremist Individuals or Groups 8 19 2.4
Tamil Groups 1 0 0.0
Uighar Separatists 3 52 17.3
Irish Protestant Groups 1 0 0.0
Unknown Motive 6 7 1.2
Summary 78 281 3.6
a Fatalities per attack.
We then placed these groups in four main attacker categories: those associated with the Palestinian 
cause, those motivated by jihadist ideologies, right-wing extremists, and mentally disordered 
attackers.	The	motives	or	affiliations	of	 the	 remaining	attackers	 (other	 than	 in	 the	 three	attacks	by	
Uighur separatists, one attack by Protestant Extremists in Northern Ireland, and one by Tamils in 
Sri	Lanka)	are unknown. Table 8 presents the attacks, fatalities, and average lethality in each main 
category for 5-year periods and for all periods combined. 
Table 8: Attacks, Fatalities, and Lethality by Four Main Attacker Categories in 5-year Periods
 Jihadist
Mentally 
Disordered Palestinian
Right-Wing Groups 
or Extremists
5-year Period #Aa #Fb FPAc #A #F FPA #A #F FPA #A #F FPA
1973-1978 - - - 1 8 8 - - - - - -
1978-1982 - - - - - - - - - - - -
1983-1987 - - - - - - - - - - - -
1988-1992 - - - - - - 1 2 2 - - -
1993-1997 - - - 1 0 0 1 3  3 2 18 9
1998-2002 - - - - - - 2 8  4 1 0 0
2003-2007 1 0 0 3 3 1 - - - 1 0 0
2008-2012 - - - 2 0 0 4 5  1.3 - - -
2013-Apr. 2018 12 138 11.5 12 23 1.9 19 13  0.7 4 1 0.3
Summary 13 138 10.6 19 34 1.8 27 31 1.1 8 19 2.4
a Number of attacks.
b Number of fatalities.
c Fatalities per attack.
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Palestinian	attackers,	who	frequently	attacked	pedestrians	and	soldiers	waiting	at	bus	stops,	account	for	
27	(34.6	percent)	of	the	78	cases.	At	the	same	time,	the	Palestinians	have	the	lowest	average	FPA,	1.1.
Jihadists,	both	confirmed	and	probable,	were	responsible	for	13	attacks	(16.7	percent	of	the	cases),	
12 of which took place after 2013. They were the most lethal attackers, with an average FPA of 10.6, 
although	this	figure	is	driven	by	the	single	devastating	attack	in	Nice.	If	this	attack	is	not	included,	the	
FPA	drops	to	4.0,	which	is	still	the	highest	of	any	attacker	category.
Right-wing	extremists,	including	anti-abortion	extremists,	carried	out	only	8	attacks	(10.3	percent	of	
the	cases).	One	of	these,	however,	was	particularly	deadly,	increasing	the	overall	average	FPA	for	this	
category	of	attackers	to	2.4.
Attackers	suffering	mental	disorders	carried	out	19	(24.4	percent)	of	the	car-ramming	attacks,	making	
them the second most prominent category of attackers. Only two of the attacks occurred before 2003, 
so	individuals	in	this	category	were	responsible	for	24.6	percent	of	the	attacks	after	that	year.	The	rise	
in	car-ramming	attacks	by	persons	suffering	mental	disorders	is	similar	to	the	recent	rise	of	jihadist	
car-ramming attacks, raising the hypothesis that either such attacks were inspired by the same online 
propaganda that inspires jihadists or the recent highly publicized attacks by jihadists have inspired 
copycat attacks by the mentally disordered.
It	is	also	interesting	to	see	which	of	the	groups	are	suicidal	(either	confirmed	or	likely).	As	shown	in	
Table	9,	among	the	main	attacker	groups,	the	suicide	rate	of	the	jihadists	was	the	highest	(46	percent);	
the rate for the mentally disordered was 26 percent; for Palestinian attackers, it was 22; and the rate 
for	right-wing	groups	or	extremists	was	the	lowest,	at	13	percent.	(The	highest	suicide	rate	was	for	
Uighur	separatists—all	three	of	the	Uighur	attackers	were	confirmed	or	likely	suicidal.)
Table 9: Percentage of Suicide Attacks by Attacker Type
Attacker Type Suicide Attacks All Attacks % of All Attacks
Jihadist 6 13 46%
Mentally Disordered 5 19 26%
Palestinian 6 27 22%
Right Wing 1 8 13%
VENUES AND TARGETS
We	identified	15	different	target	groups.	These	groups	appear	to	fall	into	three	broad	target	categories:
1. Public streets with vehicular access. This category includes pedestrians on the street and 
bicyclists	riding	in	bike	paths.	Groups	waiting	for	public	surface	transportation	(at	train	stations	
or	bus	stations	and	stops)	are	a	subset	of	this	category,	as	are	attacks	that	ram	buses	to	cause	
casualties.	This	category	comprises	43	(55.1	percent)	of	the	78	cases. 
2. Public gatherings. Attacks	 aimed	 at	 public	 gatherings	 (outdoor	 markets,	 celebrations,	 or	
gatherings	on	pedestrianized	streets)	comprise	21	of	the	cases	(26.9	percent). 
3. Public buildings. Public buildings, including restaurants, shopping malls, and tourist sites, or 
the	people	just	outside	of	them	were	the	targets	of	14	attacks	(17.9	percent	of	the	cases).
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Table 10 shows how targeting has evolved over the years. Although the numbers are very small, it 
appears that in the past ten years, attacks on public streets and public gatherings have been increasing 
as a proportion of the total number of attacks, underscoring the obvious observation that car-ramming 
attacks are about mass killing.
Table 10: Increase in Attacks on Target Categories Over 5-Year Periods
 All Public Gatherings
Public Streets with 
Vehicular Access Public Buildings
5 Year Period #Ac #Fd FPAe #A #F FPA #A #F FPA #A #F FPA
1973-1977 1 8 8 - - - 1 8 8 - - -
1978-1982 - - - - - - - - - - - -
1983-1987 1 0 0 - - - - - - 1 0 0
1988-1992 1 2 2 - - - 1 2 2 - - -
1993-1997 4 21 5.3 2 18 9 2 3 1.5 - - -
1998-2002 3 8 2.7 - - - 2 8 4 1 0 0
2003-2007 6 3 0.5 1 2 2 1 1 1 4 0 0
2008-2012 9 18 2 3 6 2 5 12 2.4 1 0 0
2013-Apr. 2018 53 221 4.2 15 190 12.7 31 30 1 7 1 0.1
Summary 78 281 3.6 21 216 10.3 43 64 1.5 14 1 0.1
a Includes markers, celebrations, pedestrianized public streets, etc.
b Includes public surface transport.
c Number of attacks.
d Number of fatalities.
e Fatalities per attack.
In most cases, the objective of a car-ramming attack appears to be causing casualties, particularly 
in	 sites	where	 there	are	crowds	or	where	pedestrians	are	confined	and	cannot	easily	escape—for	
example, on a bridge or a pedestrianized street. The venue may or may not have some symbolic value 
as well, as was the case in the attack near the Houses of Parliament in London, but this is probably 
a secondary consideration.
Even	 random	attacks	 require	 some	 thought	 about	 the	 target—the	attacker	drives	 somewhere	and	
aims his vehicle at something.
Attacks	on	these	groups	are	shown	in	Table	11	(by	number	of	attacks)	and	in	Table	12	(by	lethality).	As	
Table	11	shows,	28	of	the	attacks	(35.9	percent)	targeted	public	streets.	
People	near	public	transportation	facilities,	especially	bus	stops,	accounted	for	24	(30.8	percent)	of	the	
attacks. People waiting at bus stops were the targets in 18 of the attacks. This tactic was particularly 
prevalent in Israel.
More	than	half	(57.1	percent)	of	the	14	attacks	on	public	buildings	were	aimed	at	medical	and	religious	
buildings. Finally, public gatherings were the target in 8 attacks. 
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Table 11: Target Groups by Frequency of Attacks 
Target Group # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Bus Stations or Stops 18 22 1.2
Public Streets - Vehicle Access 15 25 1.7
Public Streets - Pedestrianized 10 34 3.4
Public Gathering - Demonstration, Other 5 110 22.0
Medical Facility 4 0 0.0
Religious	Institution	(or	Guards	protecting	them) 4 0 0.0
Public	Gathering	-	Market	(religious	or	open) 3 55 18.3
Public Streets - Pedestrianized & Vehicle Access 3 17 5.7
Train Stations and Stops 3 10 3.3
Buses 3 5 1.7
Military or Police Forces protecting a public street 3 2 0.7
Area outside Public Building 3 1 0.3
Entertainment 2 0 0.0
Public	Road	Infrastructure 1 0 0.0
Public Stores 1 0 0.0
Summary 78 281 3.6
a Fatalities per attack.
As	Table	12	shows,	attacks	on	public	gatherings	and	pedestrianized	streets	offer	terrorists	using	a	
vehicle as their weapon the greatest opportunities for causing high casualties. The data substantiate 
the obvious point that people crowded into a place that is unprotected by physical obstacles make an 
ideal target for vehicular attack.
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Table 12: Target Groups by Lethality of Attacks 
Target Group # Attacks # Fatalities FPA
Public Gathering - Demonstration, Other 5 110 22.0
Public	Gathering	-	Market	(religious	or	open) 3 55 18.3
Public Streets - Pedestrianized & Vehicle Access 3 17 5.7
Public Streets - Pedestrianized 10 34 3.4
Train Stations and Stops 3 10 3.3
Public Streets - Vehicle Access 15 25 1.7
Buses 3 5 1.7
Bus Stations or Stops 18 22 1.2
Military or Police Forces protecting a public street 3 2 0.7
Area outside Public Building 3 1 0.3
Medical Facility 4 0 0.0
Religious	Institution	(or	Guards	protecting	them) 4 0 0.0
Entertainment 2 0 0.0
Public	Road	Infrastructure 1 0 0.0
Public Stores 1 0 0.0
Summary 78 281 3.6
a Fatalities per attack.
That	point	indicates	a	possible	focus	for	designing	mitigation	strategies.	Mitigation	is	the	right	term—
pedestrians will remain vulnerable to vehicles. In the United States alone, approximately 6,000 
pedestrians are killed by vehicles annually. In contrast, car-ramming attacks have killed 300 people 
since 1973. Thus, the emphasis should be placed on safety rather than on security measures, and 
there are limitations to mitigation.
POTENTIAL MITIGATION MEASURES 
Car-ramming	attacks	on	public	streets	with	routine	vehicular	access	have	a	low	average	FPA—less	
than 2.0. The deadliest incidents occur where vehicles mow down pedestrians at public gatherings 
such as open-air markets or on streets that are theoretically pedestrianized to allow people to gather, 
shop,	promenade,	and	eat	at	restaurants	without	being	bothered	by	automobile	traffic.	
Public	 gatherings	 on	 pedestrianized	 streets	 offer	 lucrative	 targets	 for	 vehicular	 assaults,	 but	 such	
streets can be more easily protected than ordinary public streets. Vehicle access to open-air markets 
can be restricted by permanent or temporary barriers and sometimes simply by parking trucks at 
access points. Pedestrianized streets can also be protected by permanent or temporary barriers. 
Open-air celebrations can be similarly protected. 
Thus, while car-ramming attacks cannot easily be prevented, crowds of people can be better protected 
with relatively modest measures. If city planners create a particularly target-rich environment for 
understandable and laudable reasons, they unfortunately now have an obligation to consider how that 
environment might be protected.
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Other ideas being proposed to mitigate car-ramming attacks include the following: 
Armed police. More armed police could be deployed to increase surveillance and enable faster 
response to an attack. However, the time for a moving car or truck to suddenly veer into pedestrians 
is	a	matter	of	seconds—rapid	response	is	good,	but	it	cannot	prevent	carnage.	There	has	been	some	
discussion	of	allowing	police	to	fire	into	a	ramming	vehicle,	a	tactic	previously	not	permitted	because	
of the risk to innocent life.
Increased surveillance. Theoretically, algorithms could be developed to help rental companies identify 
out-of-the-ordinary rentals, much like the algorithms airlines use to identify passengers meriting 
greater scrutiny. This could prompt cross-checking with existing databases. Such checks could focus 
not	only	on	the	attributes	of	the	renter,	but	also	on	the	size	of	the	vehicle.	(The	Nice	and	Berlin	attacks	
both	involved	trucks.)	However,	such	measures	raise	civil	liberty	concerns,	and	they	will	not	prevent	
terrorists from borrowing or stealing vehicles or using their own. 
Pedestrian barriers. The fences between sidewalks and streets that now prevent jaywalking or street 
crossings at dangerous intersections could be strengthened and expanded. This would complicate 
street parking, but parked cars are themselves a barrier.
Traffic obstructions.	Bollards	or	 posts	 could	be	 installed	 (or	 trees	 could	be	grown)	 to	prevent	 any	
vehicle that jumps the curb from traveling more than 20 or 30 feet on a sidewalk.
Barriers at events. Trucks are now routinely parked to block streets hosting open-air markets. For 
instance,	vehicle	access	is	denied	to	the	thousands	who	gather	in	New	York’s	Times	Square	on	New	
Year’s	Eve.	Measures	were	also	in	place	to	protect	those	watching	the	fireworks	on	Bastille	Day	in	July	
2016 in Nice, but a security failure may have allowed an unchecked cargo truck to enter the protected 
area—and	86	people	died	in	the	attack.	Crowd-protection	measures	must	be	strictly	observed	if	they	
are	to	be	effective.
Protecting public buildings. The threat of terrorist truck bombs has already resulted in road closures 
and the installation of barriers around government buildings. These measures could be expanded.
Widening the security circle. A more ambitious measure to protect against vehicular attacks would 
entail surrounding entire portions of cities by surveillance systems and physical barriers. During the 
Irish	Republican	Army’s	 terrorist	 campaign,	 “rings	of	 steel”	 encircled	downtown	Belfast	 and,	 later,	
the	financial	district	of	London.	Short	of	permanent	measures,	police	could	set	up	checkpoints	and	
conduct random vehicle stops, as they do to detect drunken drivers or suspicious drivers and vehicles 
at airports.
Pedestrian walkways. More busy shopping streets and restaurant rows could be pedestrianized, 
already a popular trend. However, our analysis shows that pedestrianized streets can be turned into 
killing	fields	if	unauthorized	vehicles	are	not	prevented	from	entering	them.
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Technological solutions. Various electronic means for remotely shutting down vehicles exist and could 
possibly be employed to prevent vehicular attacks. Looking ahead, autonomous vehicles could be 
programmed to preclude their use as weapons, although such vehicles could be prone to hacking. 
MTI research on the possibility of terrorists using vehicles carrying hazardous materials as weapons 
has explored this approach.3
These are ideas being discussed, not a catalog of practical or proven countermeasures. More analysis 
is	 required	 to	determine	whether	 these	potential	 countermeasures	 to	vehicular	 terrorism	would	be	
effective,	to	identify	other	countermeasures,	and	to	examine	their	costs	and	potential	consequences.	
This does not preclude a discussion of whether the potential results merit the disruption and investment 
such measures would entail.
3	Brian	Michael	Jenkins	and	Bruce	R.	Butterworth,	Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway-Borne Hazardous Materials, 
San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2010. http://transweb.sjsu.edu/research/potential-terrorist-uses-high-
way-borne-hazardous-materials
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